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4.1 Introduction
We examine the behavior of two forms of nonproﬁt organizations, reli-
gious nonproﬁt (RNP) and secular nonproﬁt (SNP), as well as that of
private for-proﬁt (FP) ﬁrms, when they coexist in a mixed industry—hos-
pitals.1 In an attempt to determine whether each type of nonproﬁt organi-
zation can be characterized by the same objective function as a for-proﬁt
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1. There are many mixed industries, including higher education, day care, the arts, and mu-
seums, as well as hospitals and nursing homes. Behavior of organizations in such industries
has been studied in a wide variety of dimensions. In nursing homes, for example, consumer
complaints and regulatory violations have been found to diﬀer not only at FP and govern-
mental facilities, but also at RNPs and SNPs (Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986); in the men-
tally handicapped facilities and nursing home industries, the use of waiting lists, rather than
price to ration access, and the use of volunteer labor have been found to vary among institu-
tional forms (Weisbrod 1988, 1998a; Kapur and Weisbrod 2000); and in day care centers, lev-
els of staﬃng and consumer information have been found to vary across institutional forms







Evidence from the “Mixed”
Hospital Industry
Burcay Erus and Burton A. Weisbrodﬁrm, but recognizing the diﬃculty of observing objective functions, we
study the reﬂections of objective functions in employee compensation
structures.
Speciﬁcally, we determine whether each form of nonproﬁt (NP) hospital
provides incentives that diﬀer from each other and from those of FP hos-
pitals (a) in terms of “total” monetary compensation and its composition
between base salary and performance-based bonus; (b) for each of ﬁfteen
types of jobs ranging from chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) to middle man-
agers and technical workers; and (c) both cross-sectionally and over time
in response to exogenous revenue constraints.
Our focus on relationships between employee reward structures and or-
ganization form has two justiﬁcations. One involves the diﬃculty of iden-
tifying the arguments in an organization’s objective function. Measuring a
private ﬁrm’s “performance”—proﬁt—relative to its presumed objective
of proﬁt maximization is not devoid of problems, as the recent Enron Cor-
poration accounting practices made clear (Eichenwald 2002). Neverthe-
less, the problems of measurement and valuation of performance by FP
ﬁrms pose considerably fewer challenges than is the case with the types of
public-good outputs that are often identiﬁed with NP organizations—e.g.,
charity care (in hospitals), basic research (at universities), cultural preser-
vation (at museums and zoos), and environmental protection. Thus, inso-
far as NPs pursue these hard-to-monitor, public-good goals rather than be-
having as “for-proﬁts-in-disguise” (Weisbrod 1988), they would utilize
weaker reward structures (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), relying less on
“performance”-based bonus compensation and more on base-salary com-
pensation.
The second reason for focusing on employee compensation structures
across institutional forms relates to understanding labor markets in which
NPs operate. The question is whether NP and FP organizations compete
in uniﬁed labor markets for particular types of labor, or whether they op-
erate in distinct markets. On the labor supply side, employees could have
preferences for working in one or another institutional form of organiza-
tion for any given type of job.2 On the demand side of the market, employ-
ers from various institutional forms could have preferences for distinct
kinds of workers—i.e., in terms of worker-utility functions, which could
inﬂuence the cost to employers of monitoring particular forms of perfor-
mance.
The hypotheses we test relate particularly to the use of relatively strong,
high-powered incentives in the form of performance-based bonuses, com-
pared with weaker incentives in the form of base salary. The easier it is for
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2. There is some evidence that such preference diﬀerentials do exist. In a survey of hospital
volunteers (Wolf, Weisbrod, and Bird 1993), it was found that, while half of the respondents
reported no preference as to volunteering to a FP or a NP hospital, the other half reported a
preference for volunteering to a nonproﬁt.the organization to monitor its agents’ contribution to the organization
mission, the stronger would be the incentives employed by any organiza-
tion, regardless of ownership form or objectives. Thus, we test hypotheses
that (a) NP organizations use weaker incentives than FPs when compen-
sating their CEOs; (b) there are no diﬀerences—or, at most, smaller diﬀer-
ences—in the incentive structures at FP and NP organizations for workers
down the job ladder (middle managers and technical workers); and (c) ex-
ogenous tightening of ﬁscal constraints cause nonproﬁts to alter incentive
structures to become more like for-proﬁt ﬁrms. The hypotheses also dis-
tinguish between religious and secular nonproﬁts, for prior research has
found systematic diﬀerences between them (see references cited in note 1,
above).
The next section describes the theoretical setting and hypotheses. Em-
pirical methodology is in section 4.3, followed by results in section 4.4. Sec-
tion 4.5 interprets the full set of our ﬁndings and concludes.
4.2 Theoretic Setting and Hypotheses
Measurement and valuation of outputs are the fundamental challenges
to all attempts to specify a NP organization objective function and then de-
rive testable predictions. If an objective function includes outputs that are
hard to measure and to value—as is the case with basic research (at uni-
versities), health care to the poor (at hospitals), or cultural preservation (at
museums)—it will necessarily be diﬃcult for the organization’s trustees
and directors to reward “performance” and for outside researchers to test
for diﬀerential performance among FP, RNP, and SNP organizations.3
Thus, rather than attempting to observe diﬀerential outputs directly, we
take an alternative tack. Making use of the theoretical relationship be-
tween any organization’s objective function and the reward structures it
utilizes to provide incentives for its employee-agents, we study the reﬂec-
tion of unobserved objectives in observable employee reward structures.4
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3. For an interesting attempt to measure such output by FP and NP providers, though not
to value it, see Schlesinger and Dorwart (1984), who examined psychiatric hospitals’ provi-
sion of unpaid emergency psychiatric services by telephone. For a recent study of the “value”
of hospital “charity care” at FP and NP hospitals see Nicholson et al. (2000). At the theoretic
level, Hirth (1999), focusing on informational asymmetries, has shown that competition be-
tween FP and NP suppliers will lead FPs to emulate NPs if the latter are believed by con-
sumers to be less opportunistic. However, that model does not deal with provision of public
goods, such as charity care and medical research.
4. In recent years there has been increasing attention to managerial incentives in NP and
FP hospitals. Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999), for example, examined data on CEO compen-
sation and its decomposition into base salary and bonus and found signiﬁcantly stronger in-
centives for CEOs at FP hospitals. Brickley and Van Horn (2002) found signiﬁcant relation-
ships between “ﬁnancial performance” at nonproﬁt hospitals and both CEO turnover and
compensation, but they did not have compensation information for FP hospitals and so could
not compare the strength of incentives at the two institutional forms. Arnould, Bertrand, and
Hallock (2000) focused on the eﬀect on CEO incentives of market competition, ﬁnding thatIf NPs were essentially disguised FP ﬁrms (Weisbrod 1988), they would
want to oﬀer the same strong rewards as private ﬁrms. Even if NPs pursued
goals other than proﬁt, they would use strong rewards if the desired out-
puts were easily monitored. The managerial rewards, while strong and in
that sense like rewards by FP ﬁrms, would reward diﬀerent variables.
We turn now to the theoretic structure underlying our empirical work.
Consider an NP organization as a producer of two goods: a mission good
(M) that is socially desirable but privately unproﬁtable and a revenue good
(R) that ﬁnances the provision of M (James 1983; Schiﬀ and Weisbrod
1991; Weisbrod 1998b, chap. 3).5 If provision of M is diﬃcult to measure
and value, the ﬁrm would provide low-powered incentives, so as to dis-
courage managers from focusing on proﬁtable activities at the expense of
mission outputs (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Weisbrod 1988).
Proﬁt from a revenue good, while necessary to maximize output of the
mission good, is not suﬃcient. The organization must also be eﬃcient in
using the resources to maximize output of M subject to the available rev-
enue. That eﬃciency, however, is more diﬃcult to reward than is the gener-
ation of revenue. The optimal strength of managerial incentives thus re-
quires a balancing of the incentive to generate revenue from R, which is
relatively easily measured and rewarded, and the incentive to expend man-
agerial eﬀort on maximization of M, for given revenue, which can be diﬃ-
cult to measure. Under these conditions an NP would not fully exploit
proﬁt opportunities.
This two-good model of NP organization behavior, together with the as-
sumptions that NPs are eﬃcient in the pursuit of their mission good6 but
confront measurement problems with respect to the mission good, leads to
some testable predictions. Assume that (a) for any organization, its CEO is
the key agent through whom its mission is pursued; (b) the mission may
diﬀer among institutional forms; and (c) the mission may involve outputs
that are diﬃcult to monitor and reward (“type 2” attributes, contrasted
with “type 1,” easily-observed attributes; Weisbrod 1988). Assume further
that (d) employees down the job ladder are expected to perform speciﬁc
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increased competition leads to closer ties between executive compensation and performance
at nonproﬁt hospitals. Again, however, comparisons with FP hospitals were not made.
5. Under existing U.S. tax law, a NP organization’s mission is not limited to unproﬁtable ac-
tivities. The charging of patient fees by hospitals, tuition by universities, and admission fees
by museums is generally treated as “substantially related” to the organization’s tax-exempt
mission. From a theoretic perspective, however, it is useful to think of such “user fees” as in-
come from revenue goods, because the social rationale for granting tax-exempt status to NPs
is, presumably, their provision of socially desirable outputs that private enterprise markets
would not engage in.
6. The assumption that NP organizations are eﬃcient in optimizing their objective func-
tions subject to the constraints they face can be questioned. It has been argued that NP as well
as governmental organizations are less eﬃcient than private ﬁrms because their executives are
not legally permitted to share in the proﬁts that greater eﬃciency would bring (Alchian and
Demsetz 1972).duties that involve easily observable, type 1 dimensions of performance
that diﬀer little, if at all, across institutional forms. A janitor, for example,
might well be expected to perform the same duties by a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm or the most public-goods-oriented NP. Under these assumptions a
model in which objective functions diﬀer across institutional forms would
imply that CEO reward structures would vary substantially across institu-
tional forms. Going down the job ladder we expect to ﬁnd that the diﬀer-
ences across institutional forms disappear. Whether that occurs at the
middle-management or technical-worker levels, or at lower levels, is not
clear, but we expect relatively smaller diﬀerences among institutional
forms than is found for CEOs. Accordingly, our ﬁrst two hypotheses are:
H 1. Nonproﬁt organizations oﬀer their CEOs weaker incen-
tives that are less tied to observable performance. Weak incentives are made
operational in the form of payment of a base salary, while strong incentives
are measured in two ways: by the CEO’s contractual eligibility for a perfor-
mance-based bonus and by the actual amount of bonus received, conditional
on eligibility.
H 2. Lower-level workers—middle managers and technical
workers—confront incentive structures that are more similar across institu-
tional forms. That is, there are smaller diﬀerences, compared with CEOs, in
base salaries, eligibility for a bonus, amount of bonus, conditional on eligibil-
ity for it, and total compensation (base salary plus bonus).
In this model, managerial eﬀort in an NP organization would be directed
toward the mission in two ways: directly, in the production of M, the mis-
sion good, and indirectly, through the budget obtained from R, the revenue
good. Thus, in response to a tightening of the revenue constraint, whether
an NP would alter its CEO incentives would depend on the relative pro-
ductivity of managerial eﬀort in each activity. It would also depend on any
aversion to commercial activity that would reduce the marginal attractive-
ness of the R good to the NP (on the eﬀects of such aversion, see Schiﬀand
Weisbrod 1991 and Segal and Weisbrod 1998). For example, charging im-
pecunious clients for medical care and generating some revenue may be
feasible, but may be regarded by the organization as inconsistent with its
mission of both providing medical care and not impoverishing patients in
the process (Steinberg and Weisbrod 2002).
For NP organizations the tightening of an exogenous revenue constraint
thus poses a choice7: The NP can retain its weaker CEO incentives com-
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7. This assumes that, in the case in which there are multiple R goods, a decrease in the prof-
itability of one does not alter the proﬁtability of the others. That is, for example, an exoge-
nous reduction in revenue from patient fees, for example, may or may not alter an organiza-
tion’s optimal behavior in other revenue markets, such as donations or ancillary commercial
activity.pared with FP ﬁrms and, confronted by reduced revenue, contract its out-
put of M. Alternatively, it can strengthen the CEO incentives in order to
generate additional proﬁt, assuming that there was some revenue source
that had not been fully exploited.
No strong prediction can be made regarding how that choice will be
made at an NP (relative to an FP) organization in response to an exogenous
cut in revenue, even if, as we predicted above, the NP was operating at a
less-than-proﬁt-maximizing level in the R market. However, we suspect
that the net eﬀect of the forces luring the NP to seek increased revenue from
the R good, and any aversion to such commercial activity, is to seek more
revenue and, hence, to strengthen managerial rewards.8 In the empirical
section we test the proposition that both types of NP hospitals alter their
pay structures so as to more closely approximate FPs. Thus:
H 3. When all forms of hospitals are confronted by a tightened
revenue constraint—as might result from increased competition or HMO
penetration—NP and FP organizations alter their CEO compensation struc-
tures diﬀerently, so that diﬀerences across institutional forms narrow.9
Turning to lower-level employees, we predicted smaller systematic diﬀer-
ences in reward structures across institutional forms (hypothesis 2), and
now we hypothesize the following:
H 4. When all forms of hospitals are confronted by a tightened
revenue constraint, compensation structures for middle management and
technical workers at NP and FP organizations will become even more alike.
With respect to all four hypotheses, we explore the diﬀerences not only
between FPs and NPs, but also between FPs and each of the two types of
NPs—religious and secular. There has been little research about the mod-
eling or empirical behavior of RNP and SNP organizations (see, however,
references cited in note 1, above, and also Ballou and Weisbrod 2003). Both
forms are subject to the same legal constraints—e.g., the nondistribution
constraint, eligibility for tax subsidies for charitable donations, and ex-
emption from property and sales taxation. However, they may face other
constraints that diﬀer—e.g., donor preferences—or have diﬀerent goals.
By examining the labor reward structures in these two forms of NPs and
their responses to a change in budget constraint, we can learn whether they
should be modeled diﬀerently.
Before turning to empirical work, we should note that our expectation
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8. The logic is symmetric. Thus, in respect to a loosening of ﬁscal constraints, we expect
managerial reward structures at NPs to increasingly deviate from FPs. Our data do not cover
such conditions. However, during the 1960s, for example, expansive governmental and private
health care insurance programs were making it easier for NPs to pursue their missions.
9. Relatedly, Sloan (2000, 1142) argued that “As competition among hospitals increases,
diﬀerences in behavior among hospitals with diﬀerent ownership forms should narrow....
Private not-for-proﬁt hospitals will have less latitude than previously to produce outputs they
deem to be socially worthy.”that NPs use weaker rewards than FPs is consistent with a number of mod-
els. The one on which we have focused is that NPs’ objective functions, by
contrast with those of FP ﬁrms, encompass hard-to-monitor outputs, such
as public goods. A second, also focusing on objective functions, is that NPs
are pursuing proﬁt maximization, despite the nondistribution constraint,
but are ineﬃcient at doing so, failing to provide optimal managerial incen-
tives. A third model emphasizes the importance of the nondistribution
constraint (NDC; Hansmann 1980) as a restriction on the use of strong in-
centives to reward proﬁtability.10 Thus, if an NP seeks to act like a proﬁt
maximizer, it would use weaker incentives than an FP, assuming the NDC
is at least partially enforced.11
Some evidence to help in model identiﬁcation can come from other ﬁnd-
ings. If our empirical evidence showed that compensation down the job
ladder diﬀers little across institutional forms, even though CEO compen-
sation diﬀers markedly, this would weaken the appeal of the ineﬃciency
model, because ineﬃciency might be expected to appear at all levels, not
just at the CEO level.
4.3 Data and Econometric Model
We utilize data from annual surveys administered by a proprietary com-
pensation-consulting ﬁrm, the Hay Group, for the years 1992 and 1997.12
The survey asks questions about compensation policies of hospitals for
dozens of job titles. We utilize data on general nongovernmental hospitals,
excluding specialty hospitals.
Although Hay Group contacted each hospital listed by the American
Hospital Association (AHA), 3,732 and 3,593 general nongovernmental
hospitals in 1992 and 1997, respectively, the number of respondents (908
and 857 in 1992 and 1997) constituted a rate of less than 25 percent. With
respect to possible selection bias, it is clear that respondent hospitals are
disproportionately for-proﬁt, large, and in urban areas (that is, in metro-
politan statistical areas [MSAs]). Not all respondent hospitals report com-
pensation data for all jobs: We cannot distinguish, however, between cases
in which a hospital does not have an employee with a speciﬁc job title and
in which the hospital chooses not to provide the information.
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10. It should be noted that NDC does not constrain the use of performance-based bonuses
per se—only the rewarding of proﬁt. NPs may legally utilize strong managerial reward struc-
tures to reward behavior other than proﬁt.
11. Adjustment to NDC might be in form of oﬀering job perquisites (see Glaeser and
Shleifer 2001; Migue and Belanger 1974) or hiding incentives in the salary (see Brickley and
Van Horn 2001; Arnould, Bertrand, and Hallock 2000).
12. The earliest year we could obtain is 1992. We also have data for years 1998 through
2000. We choose not to use these later years because of an extraneous exogenous shock to
bonus policies of FP hospitals. After a fraud lawsuit against a major FP hospital chain, Co-
lumbia/HCA Health Corporation (now the Health Care Company), the chain ceased using
bonuses to reward managers, in order to reduce the incentives to expand proﬁt by using ques-
tionable business practices.It is also the case that hospitals that responded in one of the years 1992
and 1997 did not necessarily respond in the other. With respect to data on
CEOs, 731 hospitals reported in 1992 and 696 in 1997, but only 249 re-
ported CEO information in both years (table 4.1 lists summary statistics
for those hospitals). For CEOs we used a balanced sample, but for middle-
management- and technician-level jobs the balanced samples were too
small at for-proﬁt hospitals to be useful, and so we use the full, unbalanced
samples for each year. We analyze all middle-management and technician-
level jobs (table 4.2) for which we had at least ﬁfteen observations for each
ownership type.
Hay data provide the following details about compensation structures
for each job title: (a) base salary paid in the prior year; (b) whether the job
is bonus eligible; and (c) the amount of bonus paid in the prior year. Re-
garding bonus eligibility, we treat a hospital as oﬀering a bonus as part of
its compensation package if the survey respondent either checked the
bonus-eligible box or reported a positive amount of bonus paid.
For controls we utilize a number of variables characterizing each hospi-
tal and job title: (a) the complexity of each job with a given title—“Hay
Points.” Developed by Hay Consultants, job complexity at each hospital
reﬂects specialized know how, problem solving, and accountability re-
quirements of the job. This measure helps us account for possible diﬀer-
ences in job deﬁnition and scope of responsibilities across hospitals. For
jobs other than CEO, missing values led us to drop the Hay Points variable
in order to obtain a useful sample size.
Control variables for other, arguably exogenous, characteristics of each
hospital were obtained by matching the Hay Group survey data with data
from the American Hospital Association (AHA) hospital surveys for the
years 1992 and 1997. These include (b) the ownership type, (c) number of
licensed beds, and (d) location, a dummy for whether the hospital is in an
urban area (MSA), and other dummies for geographic region:13Northeast,
South, and Midwest, with West being the omitted class. Summary statistics
are in table 4.3for CEOs; data for other job titles are available from the au-
thors.
The eﬀects of revenue constraints are analyzed using two measures:
(a) Competition and (b) the HMO penetration rate. Greater competition
and greater HMO penetration are hypothesized to bring intensiﬁed bud-
getary pressure on all hospitals in the county. Competition is measured by
1 – Herﬁndahl index (HHI). To construct the HHI from the AHA Hospi-
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13. It could be argued that state dummies would be preferable to regional dummies insofar
as states diﬀer in their Medicaid policies and other hospital regulatory policies. Use of state
dummies, however, is impractical because, in our sample of 248 hospitals, most states have
only a few hospitals. Moreover, even with a larger sample, the usefulness of state dummies is
somewhat questionable insofar as hospitals are near state borders (e.g., in New York,
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.tal Surveys we used the county as the market area and calculated market
shares using number of beds.14 The use of 1 – HHI, rather than HHI, is in-
tended to simplify the interpretation. HMO penetration is calculated for
each hospital as the percentage of the total population in the county that
is enrolled in an HMO (see Wholey, Christianson, Engberg, and Bryce
1997 on how the data was constructed).
HMO penetration as an inﬂuence on hospital behavior is relevant under
the realistic assumption that the price negotiated by a HMO with a hospi-
tal, which we do not observe, is lower than the price for non–HMO pa-
tients. It is likely, however, that non–HMO patients are not a homogeneous
class. Preferred provider organization (PPO) members, Medicare patients,
Medicaid patients, and private-pay patients (insured or uninsured) may all
present a hospital with distinct prices. Thus, it would be ideal to have data
not only on market penetration by HMOs, but also by each of these other
market groups. By omitting them, we implicitly assume that their relative
importance across hospital types is a constant.15
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Table 4.2 Job Titles
Title
CEO
Middle-management level Head of dietary and food services
Head of housekeeping
Head of imaging/radiology (nonmedical)
Head of medical records
Head of patient accounting/business oﬃce
Head of purchasing/materials management








14. In the literature, a number of measures of market area have been used, including county
(Lynk 1995), MSA (Dranove, Simon, and White 1998), and measures based on geographic
ﬂow of patients (Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger 1999). While we use county, we have also
considered MSA for those hospitals located in MSAs (and county for others), and results did
not change markedly. Signiﬁcance levels and signs were unchanged, but magnitude of some
coeﬃcients was diﬀerent. For example, the coeﬃcient for religious hospitals in total com-
pensation decreased from –58 to –34, and the coeﬃcient for secular hospitals decreased from
–34 to –24.
15. It should be noted that the importance of each of these market groups depends on their
size in each “market area,” not their importance in the actual patient structure of each spe-
ciﬁc hospital. Even if, for example, a hospital were found to have no HMO patients, the HMO













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Cost containment pressures16 also operate through other mechanisms,
such as Medicare and Medicaid pricing, which we do not measure. To in-
vestigate whether hospitals of diﬀerent ownership type reacted diﬀerently
in terms of compensation structures to changes in ﬁnancial constraints, we
also compare the compensation structures over a time interval in which
constraints were tightening, speciﬁcally from 1992 to 1997. We interpret
changes in compensation structures as reﬂections of the eﬀect of cost con-
tainment policies other than the HMO penetration and competition vari-
ables. Thus, we assume that there were no systematic changes across in-
stitutional forms that aﬀect compensation structure other than those
captured by the control variables.17
Speciﬁcally, we analyze determinants of four measures of compensation
structure referred to above: (a) base salary, (b) bonus eligibility (whether a
hospital oﬀers a bonus or not), (c) amount of bonus (for those hospitals
that oﬀer a bonus), and (d) total compensation (base salary plus bonus).
We have no data on other forms of compensation, such as stock options,
expense accounts, and fringe beneﬁts, which may also vary in systematic
ways across institutional forms and over time. All monetary values are in
1992 dollars corrected with the Consumer Price Index–Health. We analyze
institutional form diﬀerences in reward structures as a function of ﬁnan-
cial constraints at a given time, 1992, between 1992 and 1997, down the job
ladder, and in response to changes in ﬁnancial constraints, controlling for
hospital size, job complexity, and location.
That is, for each of the years 1992 and 1997, we regress each of the four
dependent variables—base salary, bonus eligibility, bonus payment, and
total compensation—on ownership dummies (FP is the omitted class),
competition, and HMO penetration measures, both independently and in-
teractively with institutional form and other control variables. For the to-
tal compensation and base salary estimates we use ordinary least squares
(OLS).18 For the bonus eligibility equations, in which the dependent vari-
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16. In the latter half of the 1980s and in the 1990s, “managed care,” especially HMOs, ex-
panded, as private and public insurers shifted emphasis from quality enhancement to cost
containment. Lengths of hospital stays were cut by insurers. Patients were increasingly di-
rected by insurers to hospitals with which discounted prices had been negotiated. Price com-
petition intensiﬁed (Dranove, Shanley, and White 1993; Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger
1999). An important change aﬀecting hospitals’ revenues was the system of Medicare pay-
ments to hospitals. Beginning in late 1985 Medicare no longer reimbursed hospitals based on
“actual costs” of treating a given patient. The Prospective Payment System, based on a set of
368 Diagnosis Related Groups of illnesses and therapies, each with a price attached, was in-
creasingly adopted by other insurers in subsequent years. Hospitals were paid ﬁxed prices for
treating speciﬁc diseases, regardless of the actual cost incurred for a given patient, and down-
ward pressure on those prices ensued.
17. William Vogt pointed out, however, that improvements in information technology
might have helped NPs to better measure their mission-good performance, in which case they
would use stronger incentives over time.
18. A Cook-Weisberg test (Stata command hettest) signals heteroscedasticity, which, while
not causing OLS regression coeﬃcients to be biased, does increase the estimated variances.able is a dichotomous dummy indicating whether the hospital oﬀers a
bonus, we utilize a logit model. For the amount of bonus, conditional on
the job being bonus-eligible at a speciﬁc hospital, we estimate a tobit model
to account for the occurrence of bonuses of size zero (28 out of 184 and 19
out of 177 in 1992 and 1997, respectively).19That is, some CEOs whose jobs
are bonus eligible do not receive a bonus. Since FP status is the omitted cat-
egory, coeﬃcients for SNP and RNP hospitals give the estimated diﬀer-
ences between these types of hospitals and FP hospitals. Coeﬃcients for
the interaction of competition and HMO penetration with ownership
dummies show how diﬀerent types of ownership react to these ﬁnancial
constraints.
4.4 Results
In this section we ﬁrst report ﬁndings for CEOs and then down the job
ladder. For each job category we show the cross-sectional eﬀects of insti-
tutional form on each of the four compensation structure variables. Esti-
mates are then presented for the interactive eﬀects of institutional forms
with HMO penetration and competition. Finally, changes over time are es-
timated, by examining coeﬃcients in both years and estimating the cross-
institutional diﬀerences at low, high, and medium levels of HMO penetra-
tion and competition variables.
4.4.1 CEO
Institutional Diﬀerences—Base Case, 1992
Table 4.3 shows the estimated coeﬃcients in 1992, our base year, for to-
tal compensation, base salary, amount of bonus, and bonus eligibility. The
diﬀerential institutional eﬀects of the HMO and competition variables are
of particular interest. Table 4.3 also shows estimates for 1997, to capture
the eﬀects of changes over time. Table 4.4shows predicted diﬀerences from
FPs at each of several combinations of values of HMO penetration, com-
petition, and MSA. With respect to bonus eligibility, we note that sample
size limitations prevented estimation of equations with the interaction of
MSA with each institutional form. Thus, we estimated equations without
those interactions—that is, we did not estimate the diﬀerential eﬀects of
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Thus we use a Huber/White/Sandwich estimator for robust variances. In the tobit analyses,
by contrast, coeﬃcients are biased when heteroscedasticity exists. To deal with this we assume
that the error term variance can be expressed as a function of hospital size, which we suspect
to be the reason for heteroscedasticity, and then estimate the model accordingly.
19. Our estimation assumes that the data are reported accurately, i.e., those hospitals re-
porting no bonus payment did, indeed, pay no bonus to their CEOs. If that were not the case
and a hospital reported zero dollars as bonus payment, even though it paid a positive amount




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.MSA location for RNPs and SNPs. In table 4.4, “middle” refers to the
mean values (over both years) of competition (0.6) and HMO penetration
(0.15), while “low” and “high” refer, respectively, to ﬁrst and third quartile
values of competition and HMO penetration (0.4 and 0.8 for competition
and 0.05 and 0.25 for HMO penetration). For example, –34.3 on the top
left cell of table 4.4 means that total compensation at a RNP in 1992 is
estimated to be $34,300 less than at a FP when competition is 0.4, HMO
penetration is 0.05, and the hospital is not in a MSA (This number is de-
rived from table 4.3 as –58.3   0   0.7   5   2.22   40   0.32   –34.3). Also,
note that for bonus eligibility we report diﬀerences both in logit coeﬃcients
and average probabilities.
In terms of institutional diﬀerences our overall results support hypoth-
esis 1 that FP hospitals use higher-powered incentive mechanisms to re-
ward CEOs compared with NP hospitals. As seen in table 4.4, regardless of
which assumptions are used for HMO penetration and competition, the
ﬁndings are robust: Bonus eligibility and bonus amount are signiﬁcantly
smaller and base salary is signiﬁcantly higher at NPs than at FPs. For ex-
ample, under the middle-level assumptions, RNP and SNP hospitals lo-
cated in a non–MSA pay $22,000–$25,000 greater base salaries than FP
hospitals, far smaller bonuses—$39,000–$48,000—conditional on oﬀer-
ing a bonus, and total compensation that is lower, though not signiﬁcantly,
by $6,000–$10,000, while being signiﬁcantly less likely to oﬀer a bonus.
Do the two types of NPs behave alike? Table 4.3 shows coeﬃcients for
the RNP and SNP variables—independently and interactively—in italics
when they diﬀer signiﬁcantly at the 10 percent level or better. In 1992, CEO
total compensation is signiﬁcantly lower at SNPs than at RNPs, by
$23,000, and base salaries are also signiﬁcantly lower, by about $16,000.
However, with respect to interactive eﬀects of each institutional form with
the HMO penetration and competition variables, there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between RNPs and SNPs.
Institutional Diﬀerences—Eﬀects of Tightened Revenue Constraints
We  move now to the eﬀects of varied ﬁnancial constraints cross-
sectionally and over time. While we report ﬁndings on base salary and
total compensation, we focus on strength of incentives as captured by
bonus eligibility and amount of bonus. We ﬁnd some evidence in 1992
that tighter ﬁscal constraints, proxied by competition and HMO pene-
tration, led NPs to use stronger reward structures, more closely emulating
FPs in terms of use of bonus compensation, and consistent with hypothe-
sis 3 (hypotheses 2 and 4 will be considered below). Results are weaker for
1997 and mixed for changes across years, as cost containment pressures
mounted.
From table 4.4 we see that in 1992 a shift from low levels of HMO pene-
tration and competition to high levels is estimated to reduce the diﬀer-
ences in bonus eligibility probabilities compared with FPs, by about half
Compensation Structures in Nonproﬁt and For-Proﬁt Organizations 133(from –.5 to –.2 for RNPs and to –.3 for SNPs). Similarly,  the diﬀerences
in bonus amount, compared with FPs, fall by almost two thirds (from
–$71,000 to –$26,000 for RNPs and from –$56,000 to –$23,000 for SNPs
not in MSAs). In 1997, while table 4.4 again shows that the diﬀerences in
the amount of bonus narrow as conditions change from the low to high
assumptions, this narrowing is smaller absolutely and proportionately,
than in 1992 (from –$51,000 to –$34,000 for RNPs and from –$48,000 to
–$28,000 for SNPs not in MSAs). In terms of bonus eligibility, both types
of NPs remain less likely than FPs to oﬀer a bonus, but a SNP hospital dif-
fers more from a FP under the assumption of high (–.2) than low (–.1).
We turn now to comparison of compensation structures across years, in
order to estimate the eﬀects of cost containment policies that operate other
than through HMO penetration and competition. Table 4.4 shows that
between 1992 and 1997 diﬀerences between SNP and FP hospitals (lower
two panels) in bonus amount increased in absolute value in some HMO/
Competition cases (e.g., hospitals in MSAs), and decreased in others (e.g.,
low HMO/Competition in non–MSA hospitals). In terms of bonus eligibil-
ity, SNP hospitals consistently became more like their FP counterparts over
the period. Diﬀerences in bonus eligibility became insigniﬁcant in 1997 un-
der both low and middle conditions. RNPs, however, displayed a contrasting
pattern (upper panel), becoming less like FPs in terms of bonus eligibility.
Finally, in order to capture the combined eﬀects of changing coeﬃcients
over time and changing levels of HMO penetration, we consider the change
from middle in 1992 to high in 1997. Between those years, HMO penetra-
tion nearly doubled, from 12 percent to 23 percent (table 4.1), which is
close to the values of 15 percent and 25 percent that we use to deﬁne middle
and high groups.20 Table 4.4 shows that, under those assumptions, diﬀer-
ences in the amount of bonus paid, conditional on bonus eligibility, be-
tween FPs and both types of NPs narrowed substantially for hospitals
not in MSAs, from about $48,000 to $34,000 for RNPs and from about
$39,000 to $28,000 for SNPs. For hospitals in MSAs, the narrowing also
occurred for RNPs, from –$47,000 to –$41,000, but for SNPs the diﬀer-
ential increased, from –$42,000 to –$49,000. For bonus eligibility, we ﬁnd
that as conditions change from middle to high—reﬂecting greater HMO
penetration and competition—SNPs became more like FPs (the diﬀerence
in bonus eligibility probability decreasing from –.4 to –.2), while for RNPs
the diﬀerential probability remained the same.
4.4.2 Middle Management
Predicted diﬀerences between institutional forms at middle-level jobs
are presented in table 4.5, analogous to table 4.4 (coeﬃcients behind this
134 Burcay Erus and Burton A. Weisbrod
20. The growth was particularly great in the markets where FP hospitals were concentrated,
where it increased from 9 percent to 21 percent (table 4.1). In 1992, FPs tended to be located
in markets in which HMO penetration was substantially lower than was the case for NPs. By










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.table—analogous to table 4.3—are available from the authors). We pres-
ent the diﬀerences under two sets of assumptions. The ﬁrst evaluates the
diﬀerences across institutional forms at the 25th percentiles of the distri-
butions of competition and HMO penetration over the two years for the
full samples (0.4 and 0.05 for competition and HMO penetration, respec-
tively—corresponding to low in table 4.4) and considers a non–MSA hos-
pital. The second speciﬁcation evaluates the diﬀerences across institu-
tional forms at the 75th percentile (0.8 for competition and 0.25 for HMO
penetration—corresponding to high in table 4.4) and considers a MSA
hospital.
With respect to hypothesis 2—that there are relatively smaller diﬀer-
ences in compensation between NP and FP hospitals for lower-level jobs
compared with CEOs—we ﬁnd a mixed pattern. We are unable to estimate
a full interaction model for bonus eligibility in 1992 and for amount of
bonus in both years. Estimation without interactions indicated no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between FPs and either type of NP (available from the au-
thors). The estimates for bonus eligibility in 1997 (table 4.5) show a regu-
lar pattern, in that FPs are estimated to be more likely than NPs to oﬀer a
bonus in almost all job titles, even though most of the diﬀerences are in-
signiﬁcant. For total compensation and base salary, whether in 1992 or
1997 and whether the focus is SNPs or RNPs relative to FPs, there is evi-
dence that signiﬁcant diﬀerentials exist for some jobs but not for others.
4.4.3 Technician-Level Jobs
With respect to hypothesis 2, we expect to ﬁnd results that are less mixed
as we go further down the job ladder. Results for technician-level jobs are
presented in table 4.6, which is similar to table 4.5. As very few hospitals
oﬀer bonuses for such jobs, we were unable to estimate either the bonus el-
igibility or bonus amount equations with interactions. A regression of
bonus eligibility without interaction variables, however, showed no signif-
icant diﬀerences between FP and either type of NP hospital for any of the
eight jobs regarding their tendency to oﬀer bonuses. The fact that few hos-
pitals of any form oﬀer bonuses for technician jobs is consistent with hy-
pothesis 2—that the use of strong rewards, as measured by the use of bonus
compensation, does not diﬀer across institutional forms as one moves
down the job ladder.
Hypothesis 2, if correct, holds that the levels of total compensation will
also not diﬀer among institutional forms at technical-level jobs, nor will it
diﬀer for base salaries. Here the evidence is not clear. In 1992, with the low
assumptions, table 4.6 shows that NPs and FPs do not diﬀer in total com-
pensation, as hypothesized, for four of eight at RNPs and for two of the
eight jobs at SNPs. In terms of base salary, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences for ﬁve of the eight jobs between either type of NP and the FPs.
Over time, from 1992 to 1997, table 4.6 shows that under the low as-
sumptions many of the cross-form diﬀerences that were signiﬁcant in 1992





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.become insigniﬁcant—three of four at RNPs and two of six at SNPs. When
we consider the high assumptions, with hospitals facing more competition
and HMO penetration, there are almost no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
diﬀerent types of hospitals in either year, consistent with hypothesis 4.
4.5 Conclusion
We analyzed compensation structures for CEOs, as well as middle man-
agers and technical workers, and changes in those structures in response to
ﬁnancial constraints at nonproﬁt—both religious and secular—and for-
proﬁt hospitals. While there are many reasons for wanting to understand
patterns of compensation and their reaction to ﬁnancial constraints, our
principal motivation was to increase understanding of the objective func-
tions of NP organizations that may or may not pursue goals other than
proﬁt maximization.
We hypothesized that compensation schemes and responses to exoge-
nous ﬁscal stringency would diﬀer across institutional forms, reﬂecting dif-
ferential objective functions but only for top management, not for middle
management or technical workers.
Overall, our ﬁndings are broadly consistent with the four hypotheses, but
it is clear that there are forces other than we have considered that inﬂuence
compensation structures and incentives. We ﬁnd that NP and FP organiza-
tions act very diﬀerently in the labor markets for top management, CEOs.
This is consistent with a model in which organizations of diﬀerent institu-
tional forms have diﬀerent objective functions, with particular reference to
outputs that are diﬃcult to monitor and, hence, to reward. It is also consis-
tent, however, with other models, including models in which NPs are less
eﬃcient or are legally constrained from adopting proﬁt-sharing reward
structures. Importantly, however, we noted that NPs are not constrained
from linking compensation to performance in dimensions other than proﬁt,
such as the organization’s provision of certain public goods or delivery of se-
lected services to “deserving” consumers. The reason for using weaker re-
wards may well be the diﬃculty of measuring such outputs.
In lower-level jobs, diﬀerences in bonus and other compensation mea-
sures between NPs and FPs are far more limited. During the period, 1992
to 1997, a period of increasingly intense downward pressure on revenues at
both FP and NP hospitals, we ﬁnd that both types of NPs came to look
somewhat more like FPs in terms of the use of performance-based bonus
compensation.
Considering jointly our ﬁndings for top managers, middle managers,
and technical workers, we judge that institutional form does convey infor-
mation about organization objective functions. There is considerable evi-
dence that is not consistent with the hypothesis that NP and FP hospitals
are essentially “carbon copies.”
Public policy does not distinguish between NP organizations that are re-
140 Burcay Erus and Burton A. Weisbrodligiously aﬃliated and those that are secular. Tax subsidies are oﬀered to
both without distinction. Antitrust law makes no distinction between the
forms of NPs, applying equally to both. We ﬁnd some but rather limited ev-
idence that RNPs and SNPs behave diﬀerently.
Behavior of any organization reﬂects both its objective function and the
constraints faced. More eﬀective modeling of behavior of various forms of
organizations in mixed industries requires better understanding of how to
characterize both objective functions and constraints. This paper, utilizing
employee compensation structures as indicators of organization goals,
permits some limited inferences about the interplay of objective functions
and constraints. Attention to other institutionally mixed industries, such
as higher education, day care, the arts, and museums, as well as hospitals
and nursing homes, is needed to facilitate generalizations about diﬀeren-
tial institutional behavior.
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